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Abstract 
 
The paramount question about global climate change is no longer whether climate will change, but how we 
should respond. There is urgent need for banks and their regulators to respond, as climate change continues 
to negatively impact economies around the world. This paper examined how the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(CBN) could align monetary policy and banking regulations to better meet the challenges posed by climate 
change to the banking sector and financial stability in Nigeria. The paper concluded that the CBN must 
explore the linkages between monetary policy and banking regulation to mitigate the effects of climate 
fragilities on Nigerian banks and financial stability in the country. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Nigerian banks, with total assets and liabilities of about N33 trillion (USD91.7 billion) across several 
sectors (Central Bank of Nigeria [CBN], 2017), are at the front line in managing financial risks, including 
those posed by climate change. The stability of our economy, and financial system as a whole, depends on 
how these banks adapt to the risks posed to the Nigerian economy climate change (Drill, Paddam, & Wong, 
2016).  
 
To date, there is no clear definition of climate change-related risks for both prudential and operational 
purposes in Nigeria‘s banking sector. However, the Nigerian Bankers Committee developed and approved 
the Nigeria Sustainable Banking Principles (NSBPs) for adoption by banks, discount houses and 
development finance institutions in the country to achieve measurable progress in creating and sustaining 
economic growth that is both environmentally responsible and socially relevant (CBN,2013). The critical 
question is whether the adoption of NSBPs is enough to manage risks posed by climate change to Nigerian 
banks and financial stability. A significant population of Nigerian bank employees believed that the 
implementation of NSBPs is not a sufficient means of managing climate change related risks faced by 
Nigerian banks (Oguntuase, 2017). 
 
Against this backdrop, the objective of this study is to highlight how the Central Bank of Nigeria can align 
monetary policy and banking regulations to better meet challenges posed by climate-related risks to 
Nigeria‘s banking sector, and the economy at large.   
 
2.0 Literature review 
2.1 Climate change as financial risk 
The uncertainties involved in climate change preclude prediction of the precise nature, timing, frequency, 
intensity and location of climate change impacts. This uncertainty also depends on a multitude of 
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demographic and socio-economic factors such as technology, values and preferences, and policies, which 
also are also deeply uncertain (Kalra et al., 2014). Added to these demographic and socio-economic 
sources of uncertainty is scientific uncertainty which arises from our incomplete knowledge of the climate 
system (Heal & Millner, 2013).      
The two broad climate-related financial risks are physical and transition risks.  The physical climate-related 
risks are linked to the economic damages of increase in the frequency and magnitude of climate-related 
extreme weather events and related catastrophes such as drought, flood, hurricanes, ocean acidification, etc. 
resulting from continuously growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Dafermosa, Nikolaidi, & Galanis, 
2018; Nicol & Cochran, 2017). Banks may be exposed to physical risks through their financing and 
investment activities. There may also be direct damages to their physical infrastructures.  
The transition risks are the uncertain financial impacts (positive and negative) that result from the effects of 
setting up a low carbon economic model on economic actors. Transition risks are characterized by a 
―radical‖ uncertainty on the nature of the low carbon pathway (i.e. the pathway for reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, which restructures the economy) and a more ―usual‖ uncertainty on the methods for 
implementing this pathway in economic and social terms (Nicol, Hubert, Cochran, & Leguet, 2017).  
Over the last few years, the topic of ―stranded assets‖, caused by risk factors like physical climate change 
impacts, as well as societal and regulatory responses to climate change, has loomed larger (Caldecott, 
Harnett, Cojoianu, Kok, & Pfeiffer, 2016).  Stranded assets are defined as assets that have suffered from 
unanticipated or premature write-downs, devaluations, or conversion to liabilities (Caldecott, Howarth, & 
McSharry, 2013). With transition towards a lower-carbon economy, these assets will suffer from 
unanticipated or premature write-offs, downward revaluations or get converted to liabilities (Ansar, 
Caldecott, & Tilbury, 2013).  
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A study by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2015) put the value of global stock of manageable assets 
at risk from climate change till the end of the century at USD 4.2 trillion to USD 43 trillion. Carney (2015) 
suggested that the stranded assets problem could result in a ‗climate Minsky moment‘ involving a rapid, 
system-wide (downward) repricing of carbon assets which would threaten financial stability.   
2.2 Climate Risk Management  
Managing risks of climate change is an inevitable but very complex task, as climate change risks are 
uncertain, pervasive, and delayed, as well as intertwined with many other risks to a sustainable 
development (Döll & Romero-Lankao, 2017), but it is inevitable, as investors and regulators are 
increasingly aware of climate change risks (Dietz, Bowen, Dixon, & Gradwell, 2016; Miller & Swann, 
2017). 
Risk management has increasingly become a well-established tool for climate change adaptation, given the 
significant uncertainty about future impacts and the inability to rely on historic data as a basis for current 
action (Godden, Rochford, Peel, Caripis, & Carter, 2013; May & Plummer, 2011). Risk management is 
part of a comprehensive suite of tools for climate change adaptation, with international and national 
standards (e.g., CAN/CSA-ISO 31000) being developed to assist governments, businesses, and 
communities (May & Plummer, 2011). 
 
The IPCC (2014) proposed to address the persistent uncertainties of future climate change and its impacts 
through iterative risk management that includes both adaptation and mitigation, and takes into account, 
climate change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitude to risk. This has continued to 
inform views of climate change adaptation as a risk management function. 
 
2.3 Interaction between Monetary Policy and Banking Regulation 
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Monetary policy denotes any deliberate action or conscious effort made by the Central Bank or Monetary 
Authorities of a nation to control the quantity, availability or cost of money in an economy with the view of 
achieving set goals (CBN, 2016).  As a technique of economic management, monetary policy is one of the 
key drivers of economic growth and development through its impact on economic variables. It always 
targets inflation rate or interest rate to ensure price stability and general trust in the currency, stable 
exchange rate, high output growth rate, poverty reduction, reduction in inequality gap in the society, 
employment creation, as well as improving livelihoods (Agoba & Sare, 2017; Anowor & Okorie, 2016; 
Musa, Usman, & Zoramawa, 2014). Because financial and macroeconomic conditions are tightly 
interconnected, financial stability considerations are also an important element of any monetary policy 
framework (Kryvtsov, Molico, & Tomlin, 2015). 
 
Monetary Policy Rate (MPR) was adopted as the major monetary policy tool by the Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) in December 2006. The MPR is the rate at which CBN lend to other banks. Prior to the 
adoption of MPR, Minimum Rediscount Rate (MRR) was the major tool (CBN, 2006).  A reduction in 
MPR, that is, lax or accommodative monetary policy encourages banks to take on more risks in their 
lending. A reduction slows down the mechanism of money multiplication, i.e., makes the money multiplier 
lower.  
 
Banking sector regulation defines the rules for financial institutions at both prudential - the individual level 
– and macro-prudential policy – the interconnectedness of individual financial institutions and markets to 
safeguard financial stability.  Banking   regulations   can   vary   widely   across nations and jurisdictions 
but follows the same general principle of minimum requirements, supervisory review and market 
discipline. The instruments and requirements of bank regulation in Nigeria include capital requirement, 
reserve requirement, corporate governance, financial reporting and disclosure requirements, credit rating 
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requirement, large exposure restrictions, and activity and affiliation restrictions (Oni, 2012; Chude & 
Chude, 2014). 
 
There is interplay between monetary policy and banking regulation. Preserving financial stability is closely 
related to the standard goals of monetary policy (stabilizing output and inflation).  Monetary policy cannot 
completely ignore financial stability issues and macro-prudential regulation aimed at correcting imbalances 
can affect the conduct of monetary policy (Bean, 2003; Blinder, 2010). Kryvtsov et al. (2015) submitted 
that while the optimal mix of policies may depend on many factors such as the nature and severity of 
potential financial risks, the efficacy of each policy tool, and the expected side effects of each tool on the 
economy—regulators and central bankers must also take into account the interplay between monetary 
policy and regulation. 
 
The effectiveness of monetary policy depends on the smooth functioning of the banking system, which is 
promoted by sound banking regulation and supervision practices. Also, the monetary policy stance may 
also pose risks to financial stability, justifying that monetary policy decisions should be under the watchful 
eye of the banking supervisors (Lima, 2017).  When both monetary and macro-prudential functions are 
housed within a central bank, as in Nigeria situation, coordination is improved but safeguards are needed to 
counter the risks from dual objectives (European Parliament, 2016). 
 
3.0 Theoretical Framework 
3.1 Keynes Radical Uncertainty Theory 
Keynes (1937) 
 
submitted that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating, vague and uncertain, which 
renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. For Keynes 
(1937) submitted that macroeconomic phenomena cannot not be understood properly, if radical uncertainty 
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and the ways to deal with it are ignored. Radical uncertainty in the sense of a fundamental unpredictability 
is pervasive in the changing climate system due to several interacting sources of uncertainty (Roos, 2015). 
 
Minsky (1992) developed a novel theory – the financial instability hypothesis of the working of capitalist 
economies. In his view, the financial structures and interrelations which are essential to the capitalist 
system inevitably result in the violent fluctuations of the economy.  The theoretical argument of the 
financial instability hypothesis starts from the characterization of the economy as a capitalist economy with 
expensive capital assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system.  
 
Minsky‘s financial instability hypothesis takes banking seriously as a profit-seeking activity. Banks seek 
profits by financing activity. Like all entrepreneurs in a capitalist economy, bankers are aware that 
innovation assures profits. Thus, bankers (using the term generically for all intermediaries in finance), 
whether they be brokers or dealers, are merchants of debt who strive to innovate in the assets they acquire 
and the liabilities they market (Minsky, 1992).  Over periods of prolonged prosperity and optimism about 
future prospects, financial institutions invest more in riskier assets, which can make the economic system 
more vulnerable in the case where default materializes (Bhattacharya, Goodhart, Tsomocos, & 
Vardoulakis, 2011). 
 
 
3.2 The Climate Fragility Hypothesis 
Climate and financial fragilities reinforce each other. They are intertwined into positive feedback loops, so 
that climate systemic risks also incur financial systemic risks (Aglietta & Espagne, 2016). Natural disasters 
are predictive of higher non-performing loans and higher likelihood of default in developing countries 
(Rajhi & Albuquerque, 2017).  
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The increase in temperature and the economic catastrophes caused by climate change could reduce the 
profitability of firms and could deteriorate their financial positions. Accordingly, debt defaults could arise 
which would lead to systemic bank losses (Dafermosa et al., 2018). The realization of a climate systemic 
risk translates into potential financial turmoil and this in turn can increase around the provision of the 
ultimate liquidity. This feature is common to any systemic financial crisis which calls for a collective 
prudential approach – monetary policies and banking regulations, which intends to act on eliminating 
possible future outcomes more than on internalizing externality, because of radical uncertainty (Aglietta & 
Espagne, 2016). 
 
 
4.0 Methodology  
The approach of this paper is to systematically review academic papers, and publicly accessible documents 
from governments, central banks and other relevant regulators, and opinion of industry experts and groups. 
We used key search terms – climate change, monetary policy, banking regulation and financial stability - to 
screen identified literature, before reviewing and finally collating our findings. The conclusions drawn are 
presented in concise manner to set agenda for the Central Bank of Nigeria. 
 
5.0 Discussion 
Central Bank of Nigeria must treat climate change as a top priority that must be addressed systematically 
without delay by ensuring that its monetary policy and banking regulation point in the same direction. The 
following suggestions may provide initial guidance for action: 
1. Greening of monetary policy. Prioritize and adapt the Monetary Policy Committee, MPC 
decision-making process to consider the macroeconomic impact of climate change (Campiglio, 2016).  
2. Green Macroprudential Regulation. This can be achieved using countercyclical capital buffers; 
higher risk weights for either carbon-intensive or dependent sectors or for particularly carbon-intensive and 
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dependent companies within these sectors; restrictions on exposure concentration to carbon intensive and 
dependent assets; and climate-related stress tests (Schoenmaker, van Tilburg, & Wijffels, 2015).  A 
dedicated climate stress-tests will help to establish banks‘ portfolio exposure to climate change-related 
risks and the stability of the banking and financial system (Battiston et al., 2017). 
3. Green Finance Guidelines and Frameworks. CBN should also release a green credit guidelines 
aimed at guiding banks towards greener lending. A roadmap for a green banking framework aimed at 
developing capacities for environmental risk assessment and green lending with compulsory elements is a 
must.  Embracing green credit allocation to stimulate green investments by targeting refinancing lines to 
which the banks could refinance themselves at cheaper rates, hence providing an incentive for banks to 
lend more to the green sector by rewarding them with higher marginal profits (van Lerven & Ryan-Collins, 
2017). 
4. Green Requirements. These should include green differentiated reserve requirements favour of 
green investments over conventional investments (Rozenberg, Hallegatte, Rerrissin-Fabert, & Hourcade, 
2013). Differentiated capital requirements to reduce capital requirments on loans to climate-friendly 
investments (Dombrovskis, 2017). Campiglio (2016, pp. 226) proposes ―calibrating the computation of 
Basel III risk-weighted capital ratios in a way that low-carbon activities would exert a lower pressure than 
alternative investments.‖ 
5. Disclosure. Adoption of the industry-led Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
(TFCD) recommendations on climate change financial disclosures (Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures [TCFD], 2016). Improved transparency of climate-related risks helps a more 
appropriate pricing of risks and allocation of capital, and provides the basis for green macro-prudential 
regulation and climate-related stress testing. 
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6. Green supporting factors. Green qualitative easing programme for purchases of green financial 
assets from banks by central banking institutions to create proportionate reserves for such commercial 
banks hold at the central bank and use to settle inter-bank transactions (Matikainen, Campiglio, & 
Zenghelis, 2017). Imposing charges on ―brown‖ forms of lending to compensate for negative externalities. 
The ‗brown-penalizing‘ factor could include quantitative ceilings on credit extension to certain carbon-
intensive or polluting activities, climate-related stress tests or countercyclical capital buffers (van Lerven & 
Ryan-Collins, 2017). Accepting carbon certificates as part of commercial banks‘ legal reserves to enhance 
the market for carbon certificates by making carbon certificates acceptable as part of commercial banks‘ 
legal reserves to reduce the capital costs for low-carbon projects, thereby making them  relatively more 
attractive than ‗regular‘ investments (Rozenberg et al., 2011). 
7. Soft Power. Putting climate change on the agenda by coordinating and supporting initiatives to 
develop a comprehensive scheme for measuring and reporting institutions carbon footprints to accelerate 
the transition to low-carbon economy.  
8. Training and skills development.  Improve bank examiners and supervisors, and the banks 
analytical capabilities to identify and quantify climate-related risks.  
 
6.0 Conclusion 
Greenhouse gas emissions are arguably the single biggest negative externality of our time affecting all 
sectors of the economy. Given its heavily integrated role in society, the banking industry is particularly 
susceptible to the risks associated with climate change, a result of excessive emission of heat trapping 
greenhouse gases. 
Climate fragilities increase financial fragilities, and climate systemic risk is a potential source of financial 
disruption.  
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This paper has argued that there is need for synergy between monetary policy and banking regulation 
functions to prevent climate fragilities from resulting in financial instability. The paper calls for the Central 
Bank of Nigeria, CBN to factor the macroeconomic impart of climate change into its monetary policy 
function, while implementing green macro-prudential polices as it performs banking regulation functions.  
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